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EURO-AMERICAN RHETORICAL PRAGMATISM:  
DEMOCRATIC DELIBERATION, HUMANIST CONTROVERSIES, 
AND PURPOSEFUL MEDIATION  
Steven Mailloux 
Loyola Marymount University 
 
 
 
For over a century Euro-American pragmatism has 
developed as a philosophical movement that takes 
seriously the human significance of language. Indeed, 
one might characterize much pragmatist thought as 
specifically being preoccupied with rhetoric, the use of 
language in a context to have effects. Inside the 
academy this rhetorical pragmatism often registers as a 
language-centered form of humanistic anti-
foundationalism that refuses absolute distinctions 
between subject and object, meaning and significance, 
fact and value, knowledge and opinion, aesthetics and 
politics. In various non-academic public spheres, one 
version of this pragmatism supports a progressive 
pluralism and an inclusive deliberative democracy. In the 
following remarks, I would like to explore this tradition 
of Euro-American rhetorical pragmatism and one of its 
prominent features: a rhetoric of purposeful mediation. 
 
Among recent rhetorical pragmatists we might include 
such academic and public intellectuals as Giles Gunn, 
Stanley Fish, Richard Rorty, Cornel West, and Jeffrey 
Stout.
1
 These are neo-pragmatists who give special 
                                                 
 
1
 See Steven Mailloux, Reception Histories: Rhetoric, 
Pragmatism, and American Cultural Politics (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1998), pp. 22-42; idem, 
Disciplinary Identities: Rhetorical Paths of English, 
Speech, and Composition (New York: Modern Language 
Association, 2006), pp. 42-44, 51-52, 118-21; Steven 
Mailloux and Keith Gilyard, “Conversation,” in: 
Conversations in Cultural Rhetoric and Composition 
Studies, ed. Keith Gilyard and Victor E. Taylor (Aurora: 
Davies Group, 2009), pp. 30-51. Also see Stanley Fish, 
“Rhetoric,” in: The Stanley Fish Reader, ed. H. Aram 
Veeser (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), pp. 116-44; Keith 
Gilyard, Composition and Cornel West: Notes toward a 
Deep Democracy (Carbondale: Southern Illinois 
University Press, 2008); Robert Danisch, Pragmatism, 
Democracy, and the Necessity of Rhetoric (Columbia: 
attention to rhetoric or (more narrowly in Rorty’s case) 
persuasion in the public sphere and connect this 
rhetorical attention explicitly to their articulation of 
pragmatism as a philosophical or critical theory. Such 
rhetorical pragmatism can be viewed as a version of 
postmodern sophistry: These neo-pragmatists are like 
some older Greek sophists partly because they share the 
pre-Platonic belief in a primordial unity of rhetoric and 
philosophy. Viewed from within the historical argument 
made by Edward Schiappa and others, sophists and 
pragmatists do not radically separate language use from 
the search for truth, rhetoric from philosophy.
2
 It was 
Plato, the argument goes, who established this 
separation in the Gorgias when he coined the new term 
rhêtorikê and negatively distinguished it from 
philosophia. Rhetorical pragmatists reject this version of 
Platonism and embrace instead an anti-Platonist 
sophistic rhetoric. 
 
But these contemporary neo-pragmatists do not 
emphasize their sophistic legacy as extensively as an 
earlier rhetorical pragmatist, the once-forgotten British 
philosopher, F. C. S. Schiller. I want to return here to an 
argument I made in my book Reception Histories, in 
which I claimed that Schiller’s reading of Protagoras was 
essential to his early version of pragmatism that he 
called humanism.
3
 During the turn to the twentieth 
century, the discourse of absolute idealism dominated 
the rhetorical context of philosophical debate in 
England. It was explicitly against this epistemological and 
metaphysical hegemony that F. C. S. Schiller directed 
much of his polemical energies, especially in his two 
                                                                       
University of South Carolina Press, 2007); and Nathan 
Crick, Democracy and Rhetoric: John Dewey on the Arts 
of Becoming (Columbia: University of South Carolina 
Press, 2010).  
 
2
 Edward Schiappa, Protagoras and Logos: A Study in 
Greek Philosophy and Rhetoric (Columbia: University of 
South Carolina Press, 1999), pp. 40-49; Mailloux, 
Reception Histories, pp. xii-xiii. 
 
3
 Mailloux, Reception Histories, pp. 27-32. Also see Mark 
J. Porrovecchio, F. C. S. Schiller and the Dawn of 
Pragmatism: The Rhetoric of a Philosophical Rebel 
(Lanham: Lexington Books, 2011); and, more generally, 
Rhetoric, Sophistry, Pragmatism, ed. Steven Mailloux 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
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early books Humanism in 1903 and Studies in Humanism 
four years later. Both of these books were praised by the 
American pragmatists, William James and John Dewey, 
the former calling Schiller pragmatism’s “most vivacious 
and pugnacious champion.”
4
 
 
One of the distinguishing features of Schiller’s 
humanistic pragmatism was his use of Protagorean 
sophistry as an explanatory argument for his own 
theory. In fact, it is not too much of an exaggeration to 
say that Schiller’s reception of Protagoras constituted his 
philosophical position. That reception was an exemplary 
instance of a theoretical argument reading the past to 
mark out a place in the intellectual present and to set an 
agenda for the immediate future. Schiller’s pragmatism 
re-interpreted sophistry to establish his anti-idealist 
argument within the cultural conversation of the early 
twentieth century. Schiller read Plato against the grain of 
the ancient philosopher’s attack on sophistic rhetoric, 
and in so doing, he demonstrated how the insights of 
pragmatism and sophistry coincided perfectly. Schiller’s 
reception of the sophists locates at least one form of 
pragmatism firmly within a sophistic rhetorical tradition, 
and Schiller enthusiastically argued for branding this 
form with the name “humanism.” 
 
Humanism has always been about human being and 
becoming. In classical Greece, Protagoras said, “Humans 
are the measure of all things, of things that are that they 
are and of things that are not that they are not.” 
Platonists rejected such sophistry and could quote in 
support of their case the Athenian in Plato’s Laws who 
declares “it is God who is the measure of all things, not 
humanity as some say” (716c). Though often in other 
terms, some of the most important “humanist 
controversies” of the last century restaged this debate 
                                                 
 
4
 William James, “Humanism,” Nation 78 (3 March 
1904), pp. 175-76; rpt. James, Essays, Comments, and 
Reviews, ed. Frederick H. Burkhardt, Fredson Bowers, 
and Ignas K. Skrupskelis (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1987), p. 551.  
over Protagorean sophistry and Platonist philosophy.
5
 
During one such controversy, Schiller’s 1903 book 
rejected the Platonist’s charge that the human-measure 
dictum leads to skepticism and relativism. Instead, 
Schiller argues, Protagoras’s claim that “man is the 
measure of all things,” when “fairly interpreted, … is the 
truest and most important thing that any thinker ever 
has propounded. It is only in travesties such as it suited 
Plato’s dialectic purpose to circulate that it can be said to 
tend to skepticism; in reality it urges Science to discover 
how Man may measure, and by what devices make 
concordant his measures with those of his fellow-men.”
6
 
One goal of sophistic rhetoric is to investigate and 
theorize how this rhetorical process takes place, to 
establish what rhetorical “devices make concordant” one 
citizen’s measures with those of his or her fellow-
citizens. 
 
In his next book, Studies in Humanism, Schiller more 
clearly and more extensively demonstrates how his 
humanism is both sophistic and pragmatist. He remarks 
on the political context of classical Greece, noting that 
“the great humanistic movement of the fifth century 
B.C., of which [the Sophists] were the leaders, is now 
[early twentieth century] beginning to be appreciated at 
its true value … The rise of democracies rendered a 
higher education and a power of public speaking a sine 
qua non of political influence – and, what acted probably 
as a still stronger incentive – of the safety of the life and 
property, particularly of the wealthier classes.” The 
political, economic context of sophistic education 
resulted in “a great development of rhetoric and 
                                                 
 
5
 See, for example, late-twentieth-century debates in 
the U.S. Culture Wars and specialized academic 
controversies over postmodernism or poststructuralism. 
Various anti-humanisms, neo-humanisms, and post-
humanisms marked out significant theoretical positions 
within these heated intellectual and political conflicts. 
On the rhetoric of these and other humanist 
controversies, see Mailloux, Reception Histories, pp. 20-
21, 151-81; and “Humanist Controversies: The Rhetorical 
Humanism of Ernesto Grassi and Michael Leff,” 
Philosophy and Rhetoric (forthcoming).  
 
6
 F. C. S Schiller, Humanism: Philosophical Essays 
(London: Macmillan, 1903), p. xvii. 
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dialectic,” and the sophists definitely exploited this 
situation, growing wealthy in catering to their well-to-do 
clientele.
7
 Schiller remarks in passing on the 
contradictory (democratic and undemocratic) origins of 
sophistic rhetoric and thus prefigures later debates over 
the problematic ideological affiliations of neo-sophistry 
and the dangerous political consequences of rhetoric 
more generally. Like many rhetorical pragmatists after 
him, Schiller identifies rhetoric with democracy – only in 
such a political structure, he argues, could sophistic 
rhetoric develop – but he also acknowledges that 
rhetoric could serve undemocratic interests when 
rhetorical education was restricted to the socio-
economic elites. 
 
There is a lot more to say about Schiller’s reading of 
Protagoras, especially in his 1908 pamphlet, Plato or 
Protagoras?, but instead I want to move on to some 
implications of the sophistic legacy for rhetorical 
pragmatism in relation to contemporary debates over 
the future of democratic deliberation. To make this 
move I will fast forward exactly one hundred years. 
 
“In case you haven’t heard, Barack Obama is a 
pragmatist.” So begins Christopher Hayes’s December 
2008 Nation article called, fittingly enough, “The 
Pragmatist.”
8
 After noting how the term has often been 
used to describe the newly elected President and how 
that President himself has used the word “pragmatism” 
in recent public statements, Hayes asks: what exactly 
does it mean to call President Obama a pragmatist? In 
answering this question, Hayes helpfully points to 
“Obama’s famous rhetorical dexterity, which he’s 
marshaled to tremendous effect – giving progressives as 
well as centrists reasons to believe he shares their values 
and outlook. In a postelection essay on Obama, George 
Packer noted these two strains of his campaign rhetoric 
                                                 
 
7
 F. C. S. Schiller, Studies in Humanism (London: 
Macmillan, 1907), pp. 31-32.  
 
8
 Christopher Hayes, “The Pragmatist,” The Nation (29 
December 2008), pp. 13-16.  
http://www. thenation.com/article/pragmatist (accessed 
Dec 15, 2011). 
and dubbed them the ‘progressive Obama’ and the 
‘post-partisan Obama.’” According to Hayes, “pragmatic” 
here means something like “post-ideological.” Saying 
Obama is a pragmatist means simply that he is not a 
dogmatic ideologue; he is someone interested in 
practically getting things done and not someone blindly 
following an abstract ideological principle. But these are 
merely popular uses of the terms pragmatic and 
pragmatist. What, if anything, do they have to do with 
the more precise usage in relation to the specific 
tradition of American pragmatist philosophy? 
 
Hayes himself raises this question when he notes:  
 
Pragmatism in common usage may mean simply 
a practical approach to problems and affairs. But 
it’s also the name of the uniquely American 
school of philosophy whose doctrine is that truth 
is pre-eminently to be tested by the practical 
consequences of belief. What unites the two 
senses of the word is a shared skepticism toward 
certainties derived from abstractions – one that 
is welcome and bracing after eight years of [the] 
failed, faith-based presidency [of President 
George W. Bush].  
 
Hayes then tries to connect Obama intellectually to 
American pragmatist philosophy by way of the 
President’s political admiration for Abraham Lincoln. He 
implies that Obama’s admiration for Lincoln connects 
him to American pragmatism partly because the war 
Lincoln oversaw was a significant influence on the 
earliest philosophical pragmatists:  
 
Having witnessed, and in some cases 
experienced firsthand, the horror of violence and 
irreconcilable ideological conflict during the Civil 
War, William James, Charles Peirce and Oliver 
Wendell Holmes were moved to reject the 
metaphysical certainty in eternal truths that had 
so motivated the [dogmatically ideological] 
abolitionists, emphasizing instead epistemic 
humility, contingency and the acquisition of 
knowledge through practice – trial and error.
9
  
 
                                                 
 
9
 For a different, more detailed argument tying Obama 
to Pragmatism via Lincoln, see Susan Schulten, “Barack 
Obama, Abraham Lincoln, and John Dewey,” Denver 
University Law Review, vol. 86 (2009), pp. 807-818. 
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I will return later to the placing of President Obama in 
the pragmatist tradition, but for now I want to re-deploy 
a text Hayes cites in explaining that tradition, Louis 
Menand’s The Metaphysical Club. We can use a passage 
from Menand’s prize-winning book to transform Hayes’s 
specific claim for a connection between pragmatism and 
Obama into a broader argument about American 
pragmatism and U.S. rhetoric in general. Menand writes 
that after the Civil War the pragmatists “changed the 
way Americans thought – and continue to think – about 
education, democracy, liberty, justice, and tolerance. 
And as a consequence, they changed the way Americans 
live – the way they learn, the way they express their 
views, the way they understand themselves, and the way 
they treat people who are different from themselves. 
We are still living, to a great extent, in a country these 
thinkers helped to make.”
10
 Among Menand’s claims 
here most relevant to my topic are the ones asserting 
that pragmatism significantly affected the way 
Americans express themselves (their rhetoric) and the 
way they interpret themselves (their identities), what we 
might call an American rhetorical hermeneutics.
11
 I 
would like to follow up on just one strand of this 
rhetorical hermeneutics and speculate about Euro-
American pragmatism’s effects on U.S. rhetoric in 
various academic and non-academic contexts. This 
speculation involves making a case for pragmatism as a 
possible source for or at least influence on an American 
rhetoric of purposeful mediation.  
 
An obvious place to begin is William James’s 1907 book 
Pragmatism, whose very subtitle “A New Name for Some 
Old Ways of Thinking” implies a mediating purpose for 
James’s popular lectures, a mediation between the old 
                                                 
 
10
 Louis Menand, The Metaphysical Club: A Story of 
Ideas in America (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 
2001), p. xi (emphasis added). 
 
11
 A rhetorical hermeneutics focuses on the relation of 
rhetoric and interpretation and in one of its forms 
combines rhetorical pragmatism in philosophical theory 
with cultural rhetoric study in critical practice. See 
Steven Mailloux, Rhetorical Power (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1989), pp. 3-18; and Disciplinary 
Identities, pp. 42-65.  
and the new. James famously defined pragmatism as a 
method of thinking and a theory of truth. The method 
looked to results, consequences of beliefs, ideas, actions; 
and truth was defined controversially as what works. 
“The true is the name of whatever proves itself to be 
good in the way of belief, and good, too, for definite, 
assignable reasons.”
12
 That last phrase provides an 
opening for teasing out the contours of a specifically 
rhetorical pragmatism: The true is the rhetorical 
compliment we give (the figurative label we posit) for 
whatever proves itself (argumentatively justifies itself 
through reasons) to be good in the way of belief. Put 
differently, to identify a specifically rhetorical 
pragmatism is to work out the way that pragmatism as a 
philosophical movement is a rhetorical way of thinking 
with a rhetorical theory of truth. As James explains his 
pragmatist approach more fully, he makes its strategy of 
purposeful mediation explicit. James calls pragmatism “a 
mediator and a reconciler,” a “mediator between tough-
mindedness and tender-mindedness,” and a “mediator 
between empiricism and religion”
13
 He describes 
pragmatism “as a mediating system” and offers 
“pragmatistic philosophy” as “just the mediating way of 
thinking” his audience requires.
14
 
 
We find this same mediating way of thinking and its 
embodiment in a rhetoric of mediation throughout the 
American pragmatist tradition. Pragmatism is an 
intellectual solution to a cultural problem, which means 
it is a pragmatic response to a question in a specific time 
and place. A typical problem or question for pragmatism 
arises from the public recognition of a widespread 
cultural conflict; and the typical pragmatist response is 
not to choose sides but to mediate. This mediating 
rhetorical strategy can be seen in James’s Pragmatism in 
1907 and almost a hundred years later in Jeffrey Stout’s 
Democracy and Tradition. Interestingly, the conflicts 
                                                 
 
12
 William James, Pragmatism: A New Name for Some 
Old Ways of Thinking (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1978), p. 42. 
13
 Ibid., p. 43, 129, 7. 
14
 Ibid., p. 7, 26. 
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addressed by both thinkers involve religion. In James’s 
case it is a conflict between Darwinian Science and 
Christian Religion; for Stout it is a dispute over the role 
of religion in a democratic polis. James addresses his 
problem by mediating between what he calls tough-
minded and tender-minded mental make-ups; Stout’s 
rhetoric mediates between liberal democratic secularists 
and what he calls the new anti-liberal traditionalists. 
 
In Democracy and Tradition Stout proposes to resolve 
the dispute over the contemporary role of religion in the 
public sphere by arguing that pragmatism as (what he 
provocatively calls) “democratic traditionalism” makes 
room for religious voices in political deliberation.
15
 Like 
James though less explicitly than Schiller, he makes use 
of rhetorical concepts and traditions all along the way. 
For Stout “culture is an enduring collection of social 
practices, embedded in institutions of a characteristic 
kind, reflected in specific habits and intuitions, and 
capable of giving rise to recognizable forms of human 
character.”
16
 One particular aspect of culture is central 
to Stout’s mediating rhetorical strategy. That aspect is 
tradition: “a matter of enduring attitudes, concerns, 
dispositions, and patterns of conduct”; for example a 
democratic tradition “inculcates certain habits of 
reasoning, certain attitudes toward deference and 
authority in political discussion, and love for certain 
goods and virtues.”
17
 Underlying these notions of culture 
and tradition is a theory of practices and a value given to 
particular rhetorical practices within certain traditions, 
such as democracy. 
 
Stout’s primary aim is to “make plain” how “a tradition 
of democratic reasoning, dispositions, and attitudes that 
the people have in common” serves as the “adhesive 
element in our sociality.”
18
 Stout thus claims that his 
“conception of the civic nation is pragmatic in the sense 
                                                 
 
15
 Jeffrey Stout, Democracy and Tradition (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2004), p. 13.  
16
 Ibid., p. 28 
17
 Ibid., p. 3. 
18
 Ibid., p. 4. 
that it focuses on activities [practices] held in common 
as constitutive of the political community.”
19
 But the 
practical activities of a democracy are not just 
procedural forms: “They are activities in which 
normative commitments are embedded as well as 
discussed. The commitments are substantive. They guide 
the discussion, but they are also constantly in dispute, 
subject to revision, and not fully determinate.”
20
 Stout 
gives as examples of texts that embody such democratic 
normative values the Bill of Rights, the Emancipation 
Proclamation and the Nineteenth Amendment, Lincoln’s 
Second Inaugural, and Sojourner Truth’s “Ain’t I a 
Woman.” Stout advocates the rhetorical practices of 
public deliberation and notes the other social practices 
in which rhetorical activities are situated and which 
serve as topics of deliberation, such as voting and the 
electoral process.  
 
Stout specifically takes up the question: What “is the 
role of free public reason in a political culture that 
includes conflicting religious conceptions of the good”?
21
 
To answer this question, he rhetorically focuses on “the 
discursive core of democratic culture,”
22
 noting that “by 
highlighting the significance of public deliberation, 
democratic political arrangements bring to light their 
symbiotic relationship to a surrounding culture in which 
the shared discursive practices of the people are of 
primary importance.”
23
 Stout’s rhetoric of purposeful 
mediation develops a pragmatist account of U.S. 
democratic culture, rhetorically analyzing both past 
mediated conflicts and present conflicts in need of 
mediation. In so doing, Stout notes the mediating 
strategies of others in the pragmatist tradition. For 
example, he notes how in an earlier time “Dewey sought 
a spiritual path between the extremes of militant 
atheism and arrogant traditionalism.”
24
  
 
                                                 
19
 Ibid., p. 4-5. 
20
 Ibid., p. 5. 
21
 Ibid., p. 2. 
22
 Ibid., p. 195. 
23
 Ibid., p. 4. 
24
 Ibid., p. 32. 
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Armed with rhetorical pragmatist assumptions, Stout 
characterizes the current impasse within American 
democratic deliberation as a conflict between secular 
liberal political philosophers and religious-oriented, anti-
liberal-democratic new traditionalists. Because of the 
discord resulting from religious diversity, “secular 
liberals,” he writes, “have strongly urged people to 
restrain themselves from bringing their religious 
commitments with them into the political sphere.” In 
contrast, “many religious people have grown frustrated 
at the unwillingness of the liberal elite to hear them out 
on their own terms, and have recently had much to say 
against the hypocrisies and biases of secularism.”
25
 
Stout’s mediating rhetoric, like James’s before him, 
argues for (what I am calling) a rhetorical pragmatism, 
one that “can transcend the current standoff between 
secular liberals and the new traditionalists – and do so 
by borrowing crucial insights from both sides.”
26
 Thus, 
he argues against “the Manichean rhetoric of cultural 
warfare,”
27
 and for the pragmatic rhetoric of conflict 
mediation, not complete resolution but rather respectful 
recognition of both basic disagreement and shared 
consensual values.  
 
Such pragmatist mediation is a practical accomplishment 
sometimes aided by theoretical articulation. As practical 
accomplishment, overcoming conflict takes place in a 
democracy through public deliberation and development 
of character, that is, collectively through democratic 
consensus and individually through democratic virtue. As 
a rhetorical accomplishment within public deliberation, 
pragmatic mediation of conflict requires the 
development of consensual overlap, not prior 
overarching agreement about the content of abstract 
concepts and principles. It requires verbally holding 
others responsible to give reasons for their opinions but 
not restricting beforehand the kind of reasons (secular 
or religious) that can be used in the public sphere. For all 
citizens participating in democratic deliberation, Stout 
                                                 
25
 Ibid., p. 63. 
26
 Ibid., p. 13. 
27
 Ibid., p. 10. 
recommends a specific kind of “conversation”: “an 
exchange of views in which the respective parties 
express their premises in as much detail as they see fit 
and in whatever idiom they wish, try to make sense of 
each other’s perspectives, and expose their own 
commitments to the possibility of criticism.”
28
  
This practical, rhetorical accomplishment can be assisted 
by theoretical articulation, self-reflective commentary 
on both the substance and process of the ongoing 
accomplishment. Stout sees such metacommentary to 
be the special task of public philosophers, to whom 
Stout recommends adopting a pragmatist point of view. 
This pragmatist viewpoint sees the “function of moral 
principles with respect to the ethical life of a people” to 
be “essentially expressive, a matter of making explicit in 
the form of a claim a kind of commitment that would 
otherwise remain implicit and obscure.” The role of 
“public philosophy,” then, should be a rhetorically-
mediating “exercise in expressive rationality.”
29
 That is, 
public philosophers are intellectuals who express the 
reasons implicitly motivating citizens in their public 
deliberations. But we might just as easily characterize 
the public intellectual who performs this expressive 
theoretical function as a rhetorician. In fact, isn’t this 
public theoretical articulation an area where again the 
philosophy/rhetoric distinction (certainly the opposition) 
tends to collapse, and thus couldn’t we say that the 
pragmatist public intellectual is not just rhetorical in his 
or her mediating practice but also sophistic in theoretical 
orientation? Following Schiller’s interpretation of 
Protagoras, doesn’t a rhetorical pragmatist today 
assume the human-measure maxim (even when the 
appeal is to the divine) and try to discover and establish 
what rhetorical “devices make concordant” one citizen’s 
measures with those of fellow-citizens? Stout as a 
rhetorical pragmatist attempts to fulfill his role as public 
philosopher through the theoretical articulations of his 
book Democracy and Tradition. In so doing, he presents 
a sophistic rhetorical pragmatist framework for public 
                                                 
28
 Ibid., p. 10-11. 
29
 Ibid., p. 12. 
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deliberation in a democracy, advocating a rhetorical 
strategy of purposeful mediation. 
 
Let me conclude by returning to the academic and 
popular claim that President Obama is a pragmatist, in 
my view a rhetorical pragmatist. To date the most 
comprehensive study published on Obama’s pragmatist 
roots is James T. Kloppenberg’s Reading Obama: 
Dreams, Hope, and the American Political Tradition. A 
noted intellectual historian, Kloppenberg charts the 
marked influence of philosophical pragmatism on 
Obama’s intellectual development from the readings and 
discussions in his Harvard Law School courses to his 
immersion in Deweyan progressive political thinking 
during his days as a Chicago community organizer and as 
a law professor at the University of Chicago.
30
 
Kloppenberg comments often on Obama’s mediating 
style, his “commitments to philosophical pragmatism 
and deliberative democracy – to building support slowly, 
gradually, through compromise and painstaking 
consensus building.”
31
 Kloppenberg calls Obama “a 
principled partisan of democracy and pragmatism in the 
tradition of James and Dewey. He believes in the 
founders’ ideals of equality and liberty. But he believes 
that achieving those goals requires working to forge 
agreement about forms of democratic experimentation, 
and he believes that those experiments must be 
followed by the critical assessment of results.”
32
 
 
Besides connecting Obama with the classical early 
pragmatists, Kloppenberg also mentions the influence of 
Reinhold Niebuhr, whom Cornel West and others call a 
Christian pragmatist.
33
 In 2007 candidate Obama 
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Cornel West, The American Evasion of Philosophy: A 
referred to Niebuhr as one of his “favorite 
philosophers.”
34
 Asked what he got out of Niebuhr, 
Obama responded that he took away “the compelling 
idea that there’s serious evil in the world, and hardship 
and pain. And we should be humble and modest in our 
belief we can eliminate those things. But we shouldn’t 
use that as an excuse for cynicism and inaction. I take 
away ... the sense we have to make these efforts 
knowing they are hard, and not swinging from naïve 
idealism to bitter realism.” Here we see the same 
mediating rhetoric, mediating between pessimism and 
optimism, between idealism and realism, that we find 
elsewhere throughout the American pragmatist 
tradition, including in Niebuhr’s own book The Irony of 
American History, which, for example, praises the 
mediating strain of American thought “most perfectly 
expressed by James Madison” who “combined Christian 
realism in the interpretation of human motives and 
desires with Jefferson’s passion for liberty.”
35
  
 
Perhaps the most striking example of Obama’s own 
pragmatist rhetoric of mediation involves his thoughtful 
response to the passionate rhetoric of Reverend 
Jeremiah Wright and his vociferous critics. In Dreams 
from My Father, Obama had described his admiration for 
Reverend Wright, who, he noted, was a reader of Paul 
Tillich, Reinhold Niebuhr, and black liberation 
theologians.
36
 Then, famously and still controversially, 
Obama demonstrated his skill at mediating rhetoric in an 
18 March 2008 speech, “A More Perfect Union,” in 
which he (at least for the moment) refused to repudiate 
Wright despite his disagreement with his views. 
Throughout the speech, Obama tried to reconcile 
without dissolving many differences, many oppositions, 
not the least of which was that between Black anger and 
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White intolerance. Here is just one piece of Obama’s 
mediating, unifying rhetoric about “America’s 
improbable experiment in democracy”: “I chose to run 
for the presidency at this moment in history because I 
believe deeply that we cannot solve the challenges of 
our time unless we solve them together, unless we 
perfect our union by understanding that we may have 
different stories, but we hold common hopes; that we 
may not look the same and we may not have come from 
the same place, but we all want to move in the same 
direction – towards a better future for our children and 
our grandchildren.”
37
 
 
Given the argument I am making that Obama can be 
viewed within a rhetorical pragmatist tradition, it is 
somewhat ironic that three years into his presidency the 
close fit between his rhetorical power and his mediating 
pragmatism is being questioned by some of his former 
supporters. In “The Pragmatic President” Fareed Zakaria 
writes that liberals are disappointed with President 
Obama “because of his persistent tendency to 
compromise.”
38
 Their criticism “stems from a liberal 
fantasy that if only the President would give a stirring 
speech, he would sweep the country along with the 
sheer power of his poetry.” That is, prior to his election 
and soon after, his supporters marveled at the rhetorical 
power of his mediating progressive pragmatism. Now, 
some of those same people criticize Obama for giving up 
on the power of his rhetoric in the process of making 
pragmatic compromises. In contrast, Zakaria defends the 
President’s record of accomplishments in today’s highly 
polarized politics: “Obama is a centrist and a pragmatist 
who understands that in a country divided over core 
issues, you cannot make the best the enemy of the 
good.” Thus, we might say, a pragmatist’s mediating 
rhetoric is sometimes the only way to get something 
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done in difficult situations of extreme ideological 
partisanship. 
 
Still, it is also worth noting the limits of mediating 
rhetoric within deliberative democracy, limits fully 
acknowledged by Obama in this passage from The 
Audacity of Hope: 
 
Democratic deliberation might have been 
sufficient to expand the franchise to white men 
without property and eventually women; reason, 
argument, and American pragmatism might have 
eased the economic growing pains of a great 
nation and helped lessen religious and class 
tensions that would plague other nations. But 
deliberation alone could not provide the slave his 
freedom or cleanse America of its original sin. In 
the end, it was the sword that would sever his 
chains.
39
 
 
In light of such historical examples, Obama the rhetorical 
pragmatist notes the limitations of rhetorical 
pragmatism and its rhetoric of purposeful mediation. He 
admits:  
 
The best I can do in the face of our history is 
remind myself that it has not always been the 
pragmatist, the voice of reason, or the force of 
compromise, that has created the conditions for 
liberty. … I’m reminded that deliberation and the 
constitutional order may sometimes be the 
luxury of the powerful, and that it has sometimes 
been the cranks, the zealots, the prophets, the 
agitators, and the unreasonable – in other 
words, the absolutists – that have fought for a 
new order. Knowing this, I can’t summarily 
dismiss those possessed of similar certainty 
today – the antiabortion activist who pickets my 
town hall meeting, or the animal rights activist 
who raids a laboratory – no matter how deeply I 
disagree with their views. I am robbed even of 
the certainty of uncertainty – for sometimes 
absolute truths may well be absolute.
40
  
 
Ultimately, Obama turns back to the political figure with 
whom he has so often identified. He writes, “I’m left 
then with Lincoln, who like no man before or since 
understood both the deliberative function of our 
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democracy and the limits of such deliberation.”
41
 Not 
forgetting such sobering reminders, rhetorical 
pragmatists will surely continue their strategic advocacy 
of purposeful mediation, further developing the long 
pragmatist tradition of a “mediating way of thinking” 
within specialized intellectual debates as well as the 
popular politics of our deliberative democracies.  
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